Review On Meta-Philosophical Reflection On Feminist Philosophies Of Science 1

Among the many books I’ve collected to read, the one I’ve been most eager to start reviewing is “Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science.” Published in 2016 as part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science series, I believe this book can serve as an excellent resource for understanding the role of feminist philosophy across various academic disciplines. Even just looking at the table of contents, the papers in this book cover a wide range of fields including physics, climate change, biology, pharmacology, neuroscience, psychology, social sciences, archaeology, economics, and general philosophy, making it a potentially valuable learning opportunity.

The first article is an overview of the entire book, titled “Some Key Topics in Feminist Philosophies of Science: An Introduction.”

About the Authors

The authors of this overview are Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo, who are also the editors of the book. Maria Cristina Amoretti is a researcher at the University of Genoa in Italy, primarily studying philosophical theories in pharmacology, psychiatry, cognitive science, and feminist epistemology. Recently, she has focused on general concepts of health and illness, categories of mental illness, disease taxonomy, and gender pharmacology.¹

The second author, Nicla Vassallo, is a professor of philosophy at the same university, primarily researching knowledge and epistemology, feminist philosophy, metaphysics, naturalistic philosophy, and skepticism.²

Article Summary

This article begins by explaining what characteristics feminist philosophies of science share. While feminist philosophies of science are often explained in terms of how they differ from traditional philosophy, feminist philosophy cannot be completely separated from traditional philosophical movements.³ The authors state that feminist philosophy aims to clarify the similarities and differences with non-feminist philosophy and find ways for both to combine for better development.

Situated Knower, Knowledge

The first distinctive concept of feminist philosophies presented is that of ‘situated knower, knowledge.’ This was a concept I was already familiar with from reading “Modern Feminist Theses”⁴ in the Sandra Harding section (S. Harding is repeatedly cited in this paper as well). While knowledge is traditionally accepted as abstract, transcendent, and a priori, feminist philosophers argue that knowledge is not independent of our social positions as investigators.⁵

Of course, accepting the situatedness of knowledge does not mean embracing epistemic relativism or demanding the abandonment of the pursuit of objective knowledge. Rather, it questions objectivity that is accepted as transcendent and value-independent⁶, and suggests that objective knowledge should be understood as an intersubjective concept resulting from critical discussions between individuals/groups from various strata⁷.

In this process, feminist philosophers also critique the subject/object dichotomy which suggests that objectivity can exist independently of the knowledge-producing subject. They argue that just as social pressures influence the knowing subject, they also affect the known object, making it impossible to cleanly separate the two. The relationality between subject and object can help identify the effects of less dominant concepts that have been ignored until now, and could lead to new relational ontologies and methodologies.⁸

Set of Practices

Not just feminist philosophers but science philosophers like Thomas Kuhn have extensively argued that science is more a set of practices than a collection of theories. More specifically, science is composed of collective experiences characterized by complex interactions between group members or between various levels of groups.⁹ The fact that no knowing subject can produce scientific knowledge without interacting with other knowing subjects is obvious when considering the scientific development rule that theories or hypotheses must be verified and confirmed by other scientists to be accepted as knowledge.

In comparing members within a community as knowing subjects, or in comparing with other communities, we can easily find heterogeneous background knowledge (in theories, methodologies, discussion methods, etc.). These differences in background sometimes manifest as different (sometimes contradictory) interpretations of nature and society. From a feminist perspective, such heterogeneity can be a great resource needed to pose new questions, reduce implicit biases shared by groups, and discover new evidence. In other words, increasing the participation of marginalized groups like women in science can serve as a mechanism to make scientific results more objective and reliable, or at least reduce the possibility of error.¹⁰

The pervasive exclusion of women in science is a very hot topic in feminist philosophy of science. In fact, women have long been excluded from both the subject and object of scientific inquiry. Women were either unable to participate in science or lived in environments that made participation difficult, and because they were thought to have inferior cognitive structures compared to men, they were easily dismissed and had their abilities denied as scientists.¹¹ On the other hand, as objects of scientific inquiry, women were accepted as incomplete, abnormal beings and were only considered important when it served men’s interests. Feminist philosophers argue that such exclusion in both areas is not only morally wrong but also epistemologically negative and inappropriate. Furthermore, they argue that scientific results obtained through such exclusion can have negative effects not just on women but on everyone.¹²

Value-ladenness

A related debate in feminist philosophy is the critique of value-neutral knowledge. For example, similar critiques can be found in discussions of scientific theory underdetermination, epistemological pluralism, practical characteristics of scientific inquiry, inductive fallacy, and theory-ladenness.¹³

The constitutive value-ladenness of science has been defended, stressing all the legitimate and beneficial influences of non-epistemic, or contextual, values¹⁴

However, those who argue for value-ladenness inevitably face the problem of distinguishing between good and bad values, and must prove that feminist values are positive values.¹⁵ Generally, good values are those that are equal, pluralistic, inclusive, democratic, progressive, make gender hierarchies visible, uncover knowledge more beneficial to marginalized groups, reduce inequality, and dismantle gender and other hierarchical orders. Conversely, negative values create grounds for exclusion and rejection, hinder the liberation of specific groups, slow or reverse progress, hide gender hierarchies, make marginalized groups invisible and exclude them, and reinforce prejudices and hierarchies. From this perspective, the author states that feminist values can be considered positive values in that they produce scientific results that are inclusive, democratic, promote equality, dismantle gender bias and hierarchies, and support egalitarian and liberation movements. Equal scientific theories are important not only because they are morally, politically, and socially right, but also because they contribute to epistemological development.

(Following sections introduce individual papers)

References

1. From Researchgate profile, link. ↩

2. From personal homepage, link ↩

3. Fricker and Hornsby 2000 ↩

4. Written by Lee Hyun-jae, Lee Bong-ji et al., April Books (2016) link ↩

5. Amoretti and Vassallo 2011, 2012, 2013a; Code 1991; Haraway 1988; Harding 1991; Nelson 1990, this volume; Tuana this volume ↩

6. Antony 1993; Barwell 2007; Campaner, Galavotti this volume; Haely 2008; Haraway 1991; Nelson 1990 ↩

7. Longino 1990, 2001 ↩

8. Duran 1991; Hrdy 1986; Keller 1983, 1985; Tuana this volume ↩

9. Antony 1993; Campaner, Galavotti this volume; Harrell this volume; Longino 1990, 2006; Nelson 1990, 1993a, 1995; Solomon 2001 ↩

10. Hagengruber this volume; Longino 1990, 2001; Nelson 1990, 1993a, this volume; Solomon 2001 ↩

11. Bluhm this volume; Garavaso this volume; Maiese this volume ↩

12. Amoretti and Vassallo 2013b, 2015; Anderson 1995a, b; Code 2004; Duran 1991; Fricker 2007; Geller this volume; Hagenbruger this volume; Haraway 1991; Harrell this volume ↩

13. Anderson 1995b; Intemann 2005; Longino 1990; Nelson 1993a; Outnam 1981, 2002 ↩

14. Anderson 2004; Bluhm this volume; Clough 2008; Harding 1998; Intemann 2001; Intemann, De Melo-Marín this volume; Longino 1979, 1983, 1994, 2001; Rolin this volume; Solomon 2001; Tuana this volume; Wylie and Nelson 2007 ↩

15. Anderson 1995b, 2004; Antony 1993; Campbell 2001; Intemann, De Melo-Martín this volume; Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Rolin this volume ↩